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COMMENT

Protecting Refugees and Immigrants
on United States Soil but
Not “in the United States”:
The Unique Case of the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands
“Economically they will be a liability, socially they will present
problems, and politically we will have to work out a policy of
1
administration.”

ESTELLE HOFSCHNEIDER†
INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1976, President Gerald Ford signed
Public Law 94241, approving the Covenant to Establish a
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in
Political Union with the United States of America
1. Statement by Representative Mansfield to the United States House of
Representatives, upon returning from a tour of former Japanese Mandate in
Micronesia in 1947. 93 CONG. REC. 768 (1947), quoted in DAVID NEVIN, THE
AMERICAN TOUCH IN MICRONESIA 71 (1977). Mansfield said: “I would prefer to
have the United States assume complete and undisputed control of the
mandates [most of Micronesia]. We need these islands for our future defense,
and they should be fortified wherever we deem it necessary. We have no
concealed motives because we want these islands for one purpose only and that
is national security.” 93 CONG. REC. 768 (1947). This viewpoint conflicted with
that of the Department of State, which opposed anything resembling annexation
after World War II. CARL HEINE, MICRONESIA AT THE CROSSROADS: A REAPPRAISAL
OF THE MICRONESIAN POLITICAL DILEMMA 4 (1974). This conflict of goals within
the United States would characterize the United States relationship and
negotiations with Micronesia and later the Marianas.
† J.D. Candidate, Class of 2011, University at Buffalo Law School, State
University of New York.
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(“Covenant”).2 The Covenant was the product of over two
years of negotiation, five drafts,3 and several political
innovations—all occurring amid controversy and criticism
from, among other sources, the Congress of Micronesia4 and
the United Nations.5 The Covenant and the resulting
relationship between the United States and the newly
created Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
(“CNMI”) were unique for several reasons. The CNMI,
which consists of fourteen small islands north of Guam
between the Philippines and Japan,6 was the first populated
territory acquired by the United States in almost fifty
years.7 It was also a unique expansion of territory insofar as
previous acquisitions were accomplished through either
purchase or treaty with other established nations, making
the Northern Mariana Islands the only consensual
acquisition of territory in United States history.8 The
Covenant declared the selfgoverning status of the CNMI
with regard to internal matters, and the sovereignty of the
United States in international affairs.9 It also granted
2. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
in Political Union with the United States of America, Pub. L. No. 94241, 90
Stat. 263 (1976) (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006)), available at
http://www.cnmilaw.org/covenant.htm [hereinafter Covenant].
3. Arnold H. Leibowitz, The Marianas Covenant Negotiations, 4 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 19, 22 n.9 (1980).
4. The Congress of Micronesia was formed in 1965 and was composed of
members from the different administrative districts of the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands (“TTPI”), which was administered by the United States after
World War II. See HEINE, supra note 1, at 44.
5. See, e.g., Howard P. Willens & Deanne C. Siemer, The Constitution of the
Northern Mariana Islands: Constitutional Principles and Innovation in a Pacific
Setting, 65 GEO. L.J. 1373, 137980 (1977). The antagonistic manner in which
negotiations were conducted with the Congress of Micronesia (and later in
separate negotiations with the Marianas) was also criticized at the time for
being inconsistent with the spirit of a trusteeship agreement. See Leibowitz,
supra note 3, at 79.
6. S. REP. NO. 110324, at 2 (2008). The islands are part of the Marianas
archipelago in Micronesia, which is one of three subregions of the Pacific, in
addition to Polynesia and Melanesia. BRUCE G. KAROLLE, ATLAS OF MICRONESIA 1
(2d ed. 1993).
7. Leibowitz, supra note 3, at 21.
8. JOSE S. DELA CRUZ, FROM COLONIALISM
NORTHERN MARIANAS EXPERIENCE 234 (2010).
9. Covenant, supra note 2, art. I §§ 10304.
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United States citizenship to CNMI residents10 and
delineated limitations on the applicability of the federal
Constitution and federal legislation.11 The Covenant,
together with the federal Constitution, and the laws and
treaties of the United States are the supreme law of the
CNMI; thus, “the Constitution, treaties and laws of the
United States will not override the Covenant, since all are
supreme.”12
Unlike other United States territories and possessions,
the CNMI is an “unusual entity, in that there is significant
dispute over whether it is an Article IV ‘territory’ of the
United States, or a unique juridical object with its
constitutional roots in the treaty power or elsewhere.”13
Even the Ninth Circuit has recognized that “the precise
status of the Commonwealth is far from clear.”14 This
ambiguity was present during the congressional passage of
the Covenant itself, where proponents were hoping to
garner at least sixtyseven votes in the Senate, lest anyone
argue that the Covenant were a treaty.15 The reason for this
10. Id. art. III §§ 30104.
11. Id. art. V §§ 50106.
12. MARIANAS POLITICAL STATUS COMM’N, SECTION BY SECTION ANALYSIS OF
COVENANT TO ESTABLISH A COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA
ISLANDS 10 (1975).
THE

13. David A. Isaacson, Correcting Anomalies in the United States Law of
Citizenship by Descent, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 323 n.27 (2005); see also MARIANAS
POLITICAL STATUS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 23; Joseph E. Horey, The Right of
SelfGovernment in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, 4
ASIANPAC. L. & POL’Y J. 180, 203 (2003) (arguing that United States authority to
enter into Covenant negotiations did not derive from the Territorial Clause
because the Marianas was part of the TTPI, which “undisputedly was not a
territory of the United States, and thus not within the scope of the Territorial
Clause”).
14. Wabol v. Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1459 n.18 (9th Cir. 1990). The CNMI
falls under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which also
served as the court of last resort for local cases until 2004 when, pursuant to the
Covenant, the Commonwealth Supreme Court achieved the status of a state
supreme court with its decisions reviewable only by the United States Supreme
Court. See Jose S. Dela Cruz & Mia Giacomazzi, The Present Commonwealth
Judiciary, in CNMI JUDICIARY, ABOUT THE COURTS: HISTORY 34, 3738,
http://www.justice.gov.mp/pdf/history_ch6.pdf.
15. DON A. FARRELL, HISTORY OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS 604 (1991).
Public Law No. 94241 ultimately passed the Senate with sixtysix votes, just
one vote shy of the sixtyseven proponents had hoped for. Id.
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peculiar union is that it is the result of a complex
compromise among the variety of competing interests
within the United States government—particularly among
the Departments of State, Defense, and (later) the
Interior—and between the United States government and
the Congress of Micronesia, the Marianas Political Status
Commission (“MPSC”),16 and the United Nations.17 The
unintended consequences resulting from this peculiar
union, especially with regard to immigration and refugee
protection, are a reflection of the reality governing the
merger of political ideals, pragmatism, and conflicting
national policy.
This Comment will examine two of these unintended
consequences: (1) gaps in the protection of refugees under
international human rights law, and (2) inconsistent
protection for battered spouses and children of United
States citizens under federal immigration law. Issues
regarding refugee protection, by implicating United States
treaty obligations, have received international attention and
have figured prominently in the debate over local versus
federal control of CNMI immigration.18 By contrast, the
potential problems caused by an inconsistent policy
regarding battered spouses and children of United States
citizens has not received much attention, if any, although it
is no less significant in terms of human cost and suffering.
Both issues raise serious concerns with regard to vulnerable
populations that the United States has committed to
protect. In both situations, immigrants find that being on
United States soil does not mean the same thing as being
16. The MPSC represented the Marianas District in negotiations with the
Personal Representative of the President of the United States regarding their
future political relationship through the Covenant. See MARIANAS POLITICAL
STATUS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 1.
17. On one hand, Micronesia generally and the Marianas more specifically
were in a strategic military location and were seen as necessary for national
security purposes even well after World War II; on the other hand, the end of
the War and the rise of the United Nations marked the beginning of the
movement towards selfdetermination for former colonies. See DONALD F.
MCHENRY, MICRONESIA: TRUST BETRAYED 2627, 54, 5657, 6668 (1975); HOWARD
P. WILLENS & DEANNE C. SIEMER, NATIONAL SECURITY AND SELFDETERMINATION:
UNITED STATES POLICY IN MICRONESIA (19611972) 12 (2000).
18. See S. REP. NO. 110324, at 1618 (2008).
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“in the United States,” and that for some, the difference in
geography could very well mean the difference between
persecution and protection.
This analysis is timely and relevant in light of the
controversial “federal takeover” of the CNMI’s control of
immigration under the Consolidated Natural Resources Act
of 2008 (“CNRA”).19 The takeover, which became effective on
November 28, 2009,20 phased out local control over
immigration and established a timeline for the full
applicability of federal immigration law. It was a decision
that came after more than a decade of discussions,
litigation,21 and local legislation,22 and was largely
influenced—at least officially—by federal and international
concerns over the United States’ treaty obligations under
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees23 and
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.24 Whether for
reasons of compliance with international obligations or for
other reasons such as the United States military buildup in
the Pacific, national security, and labor concerns, the
federal takeover of immigration signified more than a
change in laws for many of the indigenous people. To some,
it represented a significant limitation, if not subversion, of
19. Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110229, 122
Stat. 754 (codified in part at 48 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006)).
20. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(bb) (2010).
21. In 2009, the CNMI sought a permanent injunction of the implementation
of the Consolidated Natural Resources Act as it applied to the CNMI. The
district court concluded that under the provisions of the Covenant, specifically
Section 503, Congress was clearly authorized to enact the challenged provisions
of the CNRA. Northern Mariana Islands v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 2d 65,
69, 73, 91 (D.D.C. 2009).
22. For example, the Act of Jan. 8, 2004, 2003 N. Mar. I. Pub. L. 1361,
available at http://www.cnmilaw.org/pdf/public_laws/13/pl1361.pdf, amended
the Commonwealth Entry and Deportation Act of 1983 to comply with United
States treaty obligations under the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of
Refugees and the Convention against Torture.
23. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267.
24. The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, was the result of pressure to conform
to these United States international obligations. S. TREATY DOC. NO. 10020,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 2003 N. Mar. I. Pub. L. 1361.
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the sovereignty that inspired the Marianas position during
political status negotiations and one of the founding
principles of the Covenant itself.25
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief political
background of the Marianas and the negotiations leading to
the signing of the Covenant. Part II will examine
immigration law in the CNMI prior to the CNRA and some
of the legal issues that have arisen out of the unique U.S.
CNMI political relationship—in particular, the ability of
battered spouses and children to selfpetition for
adjustment of status under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”).26 Finally, Part III will focus on the
controversy surrounding the development of a refugee
protection system in the CNMI, how the protection offered
differs from that which is afforded to refugees and asylees
under the INA, and the future of refugee protection in light
of the CNRA.
I. BACKGROUND
After World War II, the rule of law in conjunction with
selfdetermination became the primary goal of the United
Nations with regard to newly liberated colonial and
territorial possessions in Micronesia. Micronesia, which lies
in the North and Central Pacific Ocean, is composed of 2100
islands in three island archipelagoes spread across
approximately three million square miles of ocean.27 Prior to
World War II, nearly all of these territories, including the
Marianas, were controlled by the Japanese imperial
25. See, e.g., Gemma Q. Casas, Indigenous Group Says Federalization
‘Violates’ NMI Right to SelfGovernment, MARIANAS VARIETY, Mar. 13, 2009, at 8,
available at http://www.mvariety.com/2009031215339/localnews/indigenous
groupsaysfederalizationviolatesnmirighttoselfgovernment.php. During the
Covenant negotiations, the distinction between a “commonwealth” and a
“territory” was carefully considered by the people of the Northern Marianas.
They ultimately chose a commonwealth relationship with the United States
because it “provide[d] assurances of local selfgovernment which would not be
available under a traditional territorial relationship.” MARIANAS POLITICAL
STATUS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 23.
26. Immigrant and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101). The current version of the INA (2010) may be
accessed on the website of the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services (“USCIS”), http://www.uscis.gov.
27. WILLENS & SIEMER, supra note 17, at 1.
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administration.28 They were subsequently captured by
American military forces, enabling the American military
victory in the Pacific theater29 and ultimately, the war. In
1947, the islands were combined to form the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands (“TTPI”)30 and placed under American
administrative control per a trusteeship agreement with the
United Nations Security Council.31 The TTPI was originally
divided into five, and then later six administrative districts:
the Marianas, the Marshalls, Ponape, Truk, Yap, and
Palau. Although politically united, the people of Micronesia
were far from unified, with nine distinct languages and
even more numerous local customs.32
Such was the setting into which the United States
government entered with the goal of unifying diverse
interests under an American policy that, although varying
occasionally, always officially emphasized some form of
permanent association with the United States.33 Notable
opposition in the beginning came from the Department of
State—which opposed anything resembling annexation—
28. See About the CNMI, NORTHERN MARIANA ISLAND COUNCIL FOR THE
HUMANITIES, http://www.nmihumanities.org/section.asp?navID=9 (last visited
Mar. 29, 2011). A notable exception is the island of Guam, which is the
southernmost island in the Marianas archipelago. “Geographically, culturally,
and ethnically, Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands are a single entity
whose political separation is ‘an accident of modern colonial history.’” Willens &
Siemer, supra note 5, at 1375 (quoting S. REP. NO. 94433, at 17 (1975)). Guam
became a United States territorial possession along with the Philippines and
Cuba after the SpanishAmerican War in 1898, and it was occupied for a short
period of time by the Japanese during World War II, from December 10, 1941 to
July 21, 1944. See PEDRO C. SANCHEZ, GUAHAN GUAM: THE HISTORY OF OUR
ISLAND 75, 171 (1988). Through the Organic Act of Guam, passed by the United
States Congress in 1950, Guam became an “unincorporated territory.” Id. at
302, 304. The rest of the Marianas, including what is now the CNMI, went from
Spain to Germany via purchase in 1899, and then to Japan via League of
Nations mandate following World War I. See About the CNMI, supra.
29. The Enola Gay departed from the neighboring island of Tinian, where the
atomic bombs were housed. See MCHENRY, supra note 17, at 55.
30. The TTPI covered all of Micronesia except the United States territory of
Guam, the independent republic of Nauru, and the Britishheld Gilbert Islands.
NEVIN, supra note 1, at 43.
31. WILLENS & SIEMER, supra note 17, at 1.
32. HEINE, supra note 1, at 49; NEVIN, supra note 1, at 45; WILLENS & SIEMER,
supra note 17, at 20.
33. HEINE, supra note 1, at 58.
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and the military, backed by the United States Congress—
which sought permanent control of Micronesia for national
security reasons.34 There was such disagreement between
the two departments that military leaders and both
Democratic and Republican senators from the Senate Naval
Affairs Committee attended the San Francisco Conference
of the United Nations in order to “‘make sure,’ lest the
American delegation waver on the point regarding United
States interests in the former Japanesemandated
islands.”35 By the end of the conference, the TTPI, to be
administered by the United States, was declared a
“strategic trust,” which placed it under aegis of the UN
Security Council, where the United States had veto power
instead of the General Assembly.36 It was the sole “strategic
trust”—all other trusteeship agreements went to the now
defunct United Nations Trusteeship Council.37
In 1961, responsibility for the administration of the
TTPI passed from the United States Navy to the
Department of the Interior. Although formal administration
was no longer controlled by the Department of Defense,
military interest for control of Micronesia persisted amid
growing international pressures—particularly from the
United Nations—for the selfdetermination of former
colonies. Ruth Van Cleve, former Director of the Interior’s
Office of Territories from 1964 to 1969, described well the
predicament faced by the United States:
[W]hile close and permanent association between the United
States and the Trust Territory was regarded as acceptable to the
U.S. Congress, that status would almost surely have encountered
extreme hostility at the United Nations. Any political status for
the Trust Territory that would be easily acceptable at the United

34. Id. at 4.
35. Id. at 4, 9 (quoting JAMES N. MURRAY, JR., THE UNITED NATIONS
TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM 36 (1957)).
36. Willens & Siemer, supra note 5, at 1375 & n.7.
37. See Joseph E. Fallon, Federal Policy and U.S. Territories: The Political
Restructuring of the United States of America, 64 PAC. AFF. 23, 29 (1991). The
designation as a strategic trust “allowed the United States to exercise virtually
complete control over the territory.” MCHENRY, supra note 17, at 6.
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Nations would, on the other hand, then have encountered extreme
38
hostility in the U.S. Congress.

Adding to the tension between United States security
strategy and United Nations diplomacy was the formation
of the Congress of Micronesia in 1965, partly as a result of
dissatisfaction with the continued neglect of development
programs,39 and partly as a result of Micronesians returning
from higher education abroad—desiring a greater role in
decision making processes governing their political
destiny.40
In 1972, Saipan and the Marianas District sought to
negotiate separately with the United States. The United
States, anticipating this move, accepted the request and
immediately began separate negotiations.41 This separation
from the Congress of Micronesia and the willingness of the
United States to negotiate separately caused considerable
consternation among the remaining five districts, which
saw this as weakening the bargaining position of Micronesia
as a whole.42 The United Nations was likewise suspicious
and had originally questioned the legitimacy of the new
arrangement.43 In response, the United States emphasized
that according to the terms of the Trusteeship Agreement, it
was to consider the wishes of the “peoples” of Micronesia;
and that the Marianas, which was recognized as being
distinct from the rest of Micronesia, had spoken and had
asked of their own accord to enter into separate status
negotiations.44 Despite opposition, by 1975 the Congress of
Micronesia and the United Nations had accepted the
Marianas secession, leaving no real opposition to the

38. MCHENRY, supra note 17, at 22 (quoting RUTH G. VAN CLEVE, THE OFFICE
142 (1974)).

OF TERRITORIAL AFFAIRS

39. See HEINE, supra note 1, at 56. The period from 1951 to 1961 was
commonly referred to as the “Rust Territory.” DAVID DAMAS, BOUNTIFUL ISLAND:
A STUDY OF LAND TENURE ON A MICRONESIAN ATOLL 41 (1994).
40. See HEINE, supra note 1, at 44.
41. Willens & Siemer, supra note 5, at 1373, 1378 & n.20.
42. See HEINE, supra note 1, at 53.
43. See Willens & Siemer, supra note 5, at 1379 & n.28, 1380.
44. Id. at 1380 n.29.
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Covenant forming a political union between the Northern
Mariana Islands and the United States.45
Both the United States and the Marianas District had
an interest in a closer alliance. On the United States side,
the military interest was still present since the Marianas,
perhaps more than the other islands in Micronesia, was
strategically important in the past and possibly in the
future. Saipan was the site of CIA operations in
Micronesia.46 Guam, which had a United States military
base, proved militarily indefensible on its own during World
War II,47 and it was also geographically a part of the
Marianas archipelago. The District’s location in the
northwest corner of Micronesia also made it closer than
most of the other islands to various Asian countries of
interest, such as Japan and China—but not close enough to
be too vulnerable.48 If not in Micronesia, the closest military
bases to Asia on United States soil would be in Hawaii,
which would be too far.49
On the Marianas side, there was also much interest in a
closer relationship with the United States for several
reasons. First, there was a desire for reunification with
Guam, which shared the same language and culture with
the rest of the Marianas.50 Second, there were talks of
opening a military base on the island of Tinian, which was

45. Id. at 1380 & n.31.
46. NEVIN, supra note 1, at 78.
47. See id. at 72.
48. See id.
49. MCHENRY, supra note 17, at 6970. Although the United States had
military bases in several Asian countries, Defense officials saw a need for
facilities on United Statescontrolled soil in the Pacific in case these countries
expelled the United States military from their territory, and also because
certain military activities were restricted in some Asian countries. Id. at 69.
50. See James A. Branch, Jr., The Constitution of the Northern Mariana
Islands: Does a Different Cultural Setting Justify Different Constitutional
Standards? 9 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 35, 55 (1980). In 1969, the people of
Guam voted against reintegration with the rest of the Marianas. FARRELL, supra
note 15, at 543. The people of the Northern Marianas, however, still voted in
favor of integration. Id. There are several theories as to why Guam voted
against reunification, including lack of information and a fear of a weaker
economy. See id. at 54346.
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seen as a potential revenuegenerator.51 Third, the Marianas
was seen as particularly distinguished from the rest of
Micronesia—culturally and economically.52 Finally, as a
result of the United States policy of insulating Micronesia,
specifically the Marianas, from any other outside influence,
the Marianas was economically dependent on the United
States and did not really have any other model upon which
to base its governance.53
Although the Marianas District was more receptive to
ideas of integration, negotiations with the United States
were not always without incident, and a final agreement
took over two years and five drafts.54 The Marianas, which if
the
Covenant
were
accepted
would
become
a
“commonwealth,” felt that there should be a distinction
between a commonwealth and a territory, with more powers
of selfgovernment afforded to a commonwealth.55 The
United States, by contrast, desired no such distinction.56
The Marianas wanted to reserve the ability to unilaterally
terminate the agreement, a request which the United States
denied.57 Instead, mutual consent became the guiding
principle of the Covenant. As critics point out, this
agreement does not follow United Nations guidelines for
either “free association” or “integration.”58 It is not a
compact for free association since there is a mutual consent
provision, nor is it an agreement for integration because,
although residents were granted United States citizenship,
51. See MCHENRY, supra note 17, at 65. Micronesians have generally favored
United States military presence, in part for economic reasons. Id. at 68.
52. See Willens & Siemer, supra note 5, at 1379.
53. The CIA base that was on Saipan meant not only economic advantages
for the Marianas more than for other Micronesian districts, it also meant the
area was highly restricted for “security reasons.” See MCHENRY, supra note 17,
at 57. According to one author, the United States had “consciously frozen out
other influences,” which included barring trade until 1974, two years after
separate negotiations with the Marianas District began, and making it difficult
for people to travel outside the region. NEVIN, supra note 1, at 25; see also
HEINE, supra note 1, at 5657.
54. Leibowitz, supra note 3, at 22 n.9.
55. Id. at 2425.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 60.
58. Fallon, supra note 37, at 2728.
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they lack the ability for full participation in the government
process—they have no representatives in the United States
Congress and they are ineligible to vote for President unless
they move to and establish residency in one of the several
states.59 Nevertheless, the process towards a political union,
albeit ambiguous, continued between the parties and on
June 17, 1975, 78.8% of the eligible voters in the Northern
Marianas voted in favor of the Covenant.60 A month later
the Covenant was approved by the United States House of
Representatives.61
Although the Covenant passed in the House easily, it
was met with some opposition in the Senate. Opposition
included senators who preferred that the Marianas be a
part of Micronesia, and some who thought that this
separate agreement was a violation of UN guidelines on
selfdetermination.62 Others felt that the Covenant would
unfairly benefit the Marianas compared to other states, and
still others felt the land restrictions to those of Northern
Marianas descent were unconstitutional since United States
citizens of Northern Marianas descent could purchase land
on the mainland United States, but United States citizens
who were not of Northern Marianas descent could not
purchase land in the Commonwealth.63
To overcome opposition, negotiators on both sides
lobbied individual senators. The Department of Defense also
publicly supported the Covenant and issued a statement
asserting that “[p]olitically, economically, and militarily, it
is in the national interest of the United States to be capable
of maintaining an equilibrium of power in the East Asia and
Pacific region” and that this would require a “credible
presence on the part of the United States, particularly in a
military sense—to demonstrate resolve . . . to protect
economic interests.”64 In February of 1976, more than seven
months after the Covenant had cleared the House, the
Senate passed the resolution with sixtysix votes supporting
59. See id. at 26 & n.4, 2729.
60. FARRELL, supra note 15, at 600.
61. Id. at 601.
62. Id. at 602.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 603 (quoting Robert Ellsworth, then Deputy Secretary of Defense,
U.S. Department of Defense).
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the Covenant.65 Exactly one month after the Senate vote,
President Ford signed Public Law 94241 and the
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands became
the newest member in the American political family.66
II. IMMIGRATION LAW PRIOR TO THE CNRA AND VAWA SELF
PETITIONERS
Article V, Section 503 of the Covenant expressly states
that the immigration and nationality laws of the United
States “will not apply to the Northern Mariana Islands
except in the manner and to the extent made applicable to
them by the Congress by law after termination of the
Trusteeship Agreement.”67 This local authority over
immigration was a major distinguishing feature of the U.S.
CNMI relationship that differentiated it from any other
territorial
relationship,
including
that
with
the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.68 Exceptions to the
inapplicability of United States immigration and
naturalization laws are found in Section 506:
(a) [T]he Northern Mariana Islands will be deemed to be a part of
the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act, [8
U.S.C. 1101], as amended . . . to the extent indicated in each of the
following Subsections of this Section.
(b) With respect to children born abroad to United States citizen
or noncitizen national parents permanently residing in the
Northern Mariana Islands the provisions of Sections 301 and 308
of [the INA] will apply.
(c) With respect to aliens who are “immediate relatives” . . . of
United States citizens who are permanently residing in the
Northern Mariana Islands all the provisions of [the INA] will
69
apply . . . .

According to the MPSC, which negotiated the Covenant
on behalf of the Marianas, Subsection (a) emphasized the
limited applicability of the INA only to address “certain
65. Id. at 604.
66. Id. at 605.
67. Covenant, supra note 2, art. V § 503(a).
68. MARIANAS POLITICAL STATUS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 5556.
69. Covenant, supra note 2, art. V §§ 506(a)(c).
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problems [that] could arise which would be bothersome and
annoying to the people of the Northern Marianas”70—
namely, how to deal with children born outside of the
United States or the CNMI to United States citizen or non
citizen national parent(s),71 and how to deal with immediate
relatives of United States citizens permanently residing in
the CNMI.72 Subsections (b) and (c) were deemed necessary
to ensure that these groups would not be considered aliens.73
Overall, Section 506 was intended to be supplementary to
the immigration laws of the CNMI.74
Because the INA was for the most part inapplicable, the
language of the statute did not expressly include the CNMI
in the definition the “United States,” nor did it expressly
exclude it: “[t]he term ‘United States,’ except as otherwise
specifically herein provided, when used in a geographical
sense, means the continental United States, Alaska,
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the
United States.”75 This definition of the “United States”
would become particularly problematic for immigrant
victims of severe domestic abuse who wanted to escape the
violence in their homes, but still wanted to maintain their
“immediate relative” status and eventually naturalize as
United States citizens.
In general, the INA requires that immigration petitions
be filed by either an employer or relative. Because this
70. MARIANAS POLITICAL STATUS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 62.
71. Under the INA, a “noncitizen national” is a United States national but
not a United States citizen. While all United States citizens are considered
United States nationals, a very narrow category of persons are considered
United States nationals, but not United States citizens. These include persons
born in or having ties with “an outlying possession of the United States” (i.e.,
American Samoa and Swains Island), as well as those in the CNMI who opted
for noncitizen national status instead of United States citizenship under
Section 302 of the Covenant. See Certificates of Non Citizen Nationality, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, http://www.travel.state.gov/
law/citizenship/citizenship_781.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
72. MARIANAS POLITICAL STATUS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 6263.
73. Id. at 63.
74. Id. at 62.
75. Ahmed v. Goldberg, No. Civ.A. 000005, 2001 WL 1842399, at *5 n.19 (D.
N. Mar. I. May 11, 2001) (quoting the INA, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(38) (1999)). 8
U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(38) (2010) now includes “the Commonwealth of the Northern
Mariana Islands.”
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process is heavily dependent on the United States citizen or
lawful permanent resident (“LPR”)76 relative, it is often used
as a tool of abuse for many immigrant victims of domestic
violence.77 Immigrants can be particularly vulnerable to
abuse due to differences in language, unfamiliarity with the
law, and separation from family and friends in their home
country; these differences in turn can adversely affect access
to resources and can create greater isolation for immigrant
victims of abuse than for nonimmigrant victims.78 When
children are involved, immigrant victims may also be more
reluctant to leave abusive relationships or to report abusive
spouses. For instance, if the immigrant victim is not
lawfully present in the United States and the abuser is
either a United States citizen or LPR, the abuser may
threaten to report the victim to immigration officials or to
have the victim deported while the children remain in the
United States with the abuser.79 If the abuser is a non
citizen and the victim reports the abuse to the police, there
is a possibility that the abuser will be subject to deportation
or removal, which can then lead to other consequences, such
76. According to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), a “Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR)” is defined as “[a]ny person not
a citizen of the United States who is residing in the U.S. under legally
recognized and lawfully recorded permanent residence as an immigrant. Also
known as ‘Permanent Resident Alien,’ ‘Resident Alien Permit Holder,’ and
‘Green Card Holder.’” U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Glossary Definition of “LPR”,
USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov (follow “RESOURCES” hyperlink; then follow
“Glossary” hyperlink; then follow “Lawful Permanent Resident (LPR)”
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
77. Fact Sheet: USCIS Issues Guidance for Approved Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA) SelfPetitioners, USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov (follow “NEWS”
hyperlink; then follow hyperlink to fact sheet under 04/22/2008) (last visited
Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter USCIS Guidance for SelfPetitioners].
78. Cecilia Menjívar & Olivia Salcido, Immigrant Women and Domestic
Violence: Common Experiences in Different Countries, 16 GENDER & SOC’Y 898,
90306 (2002); see also Information on the Legal Rights Available to Immigrant
Victims of Domestic Violence in the United States and Facts about Immigrating
on a MarriageBased Visa Fact Sheet, USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov (follow
“NEWS” hyperlink; then follow “Fact Sheets” hyperlink; then follow hyperlink
to fact sheet under 01/11/2011) (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
79. Lori L. Cohen, Representing Immigrant Victims of Domestic Violence, in
LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM 309, 311
(Jill Laurie Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholdt eds., 5th ed. 2006), available at
http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/womeninthecourts/DVLawyersManual
Book.pdf.
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as loss of a source—sometimes the only source—of income
and retaliation against the victim’s family members
abroad.80
In the CNMI, immigrant spouses face the same
vulnerabilities, and the reasons for remaining in abusive
relationships likewise are no different. Many of these
families include children who were born in the CNMI and
who are unfamiliar with any other culture or any language
other than English. Economic realities also play a role in
the reluctance to leave. Battered spouses—usually women—
who came from developing countries do not want to return
to severe poverty with their United States citizen children
who could at least receive public assistance in the CNMI
and the opportunity, at least it is hoped, for a better life; but
more importantly, they do not want to risk the possibility of
leaving the child or children behind with the abusive
spouse.
In response to the problem of abusive family members
using immigration status as a tool of coercion, the Violence
Against Women Act (“VAWA”)81 passed by the United States
Congress allows abused spouses and children the
opportunity to “selfpetition” or independently seek legal
immigration status in the United States.82 The first step in
that process is filing an I360 Petition with the United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”).83
There are seven requirements that every applicant must
meet in order to qualify to become a selfpetitioner84:
80. See id. at 312. A conviction for a crime of domestic violence, stalking,
child abuse, or violation of an order of protection can make an immigrant
removable. Id.
81. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1491
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 note (2006)).
82. See USCIS Guidance for SelfPetitioners, supra note 77.
83. See Form I360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant,
OMB No. 16150020, USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i360.pdf (last
visited Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Form I360]. This form is used by a variety of
other groups or “special immigrants” such as religious workers, armed forces
members, physicians, and Iraq or Afghani nationals who served as translators
for the United States Armed Forces.
84. Instructions for Form I360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special
Immigrant, OMB No. 16150020, 6, USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i
360instr.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2011) [hereinafter Instructions for Form I
360].

2011]

PROTECTING REFUGEES

825

(1) The applicant must currently be the “spouse or
child of an abusive U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident”;85
(2) The applicant must be “eligible for immigrant
classification based on that relationship”;86
(3) The applicant must be “[currently] residing in the
United States or have resided in the United States with the
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident abuser in the
past”;87
(4) The applicant must “[h]ave been battered by or have
been the subject of extreme cruelty” perpetrated by the
United States citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse
during the marriage; or be the “parent of a child who has
been battered by or has been the subject of extreme cruelty
perpetrated by [the applicant’s] abusive citizen or lawful
permanent resident spouse during [the] marriage;” or else
the applicant must have been battered or have been the
subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by the citizen or
lawful permanent resident parent while living with the
parent;88
(5) The applicant must be “a person of good moral
character”;89
(6) The applicant must be “a person whose removal or
deportation would result in extreme hardship” to the
applicant or the applicant’s child if applicant is a spouse; 90
and

85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. Section 101(f) of the INA describes the classes of aliens who are
statutorily ineligible to be considered persons of good moral character. See
Interoffice Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. of Operations,
USCIS, to Paul E. Novak, Dir., Vermont Serv. Ctr. (Jan. 19, 2005), available at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/GMC_011905.pdf (last visited Mar. 30,
2011) (describing the unique situation of domestic violence and the availability
of waivers for certain conduct that adversely affects a finding of good moral
character).
90. Instructions for Form I360, supra note 84, at 6.
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(7) If the applicant is an abused spouse, that the
marriage with the abusive citizen or lawful permanent
resident spouse was entered into “in good faith.”91
The legal issue with abused immigrant spouses and
children in the CNMI was that in order to be eligible to
apply as selfpetitioners using the I360, they must have
been currently residing in, or at one time have resided with
the abuser “in the United States.”92 According to the INA
(preCNRA), the “United States” when used in a
geographical sense did not expressly include the CNMI.93
This reasoning became the basis for the rejection of an I360
submitted on behalf of an applicant residing in the CNMI.
Compounding the disappointment surrounding this decision
and confounding victims’ advocates was the fact that earlier
I360 petitions from applicants in the CNMI had been
approved by USCIS;94 thus, to reject an application based on
geographical ineligibility simply did not make any sense.
Furthermore, the decision to leave a violent relationship
or to risk the suspicion of leaving through filing a self
petition is often a dangerous process. It is especially
dangerous for immigrants in the CNMI, where the largest
island of Saipan is about thirteen miles long and six miles
wide, and where there are only two other smaller islands to
which they could lawfully flee with only a CNMI entry
permit.95 For this reason, the denial of a petition based on a
geographical technicality was also a halt in the progress
towards greater protection of domestic violence victims, as
well as a perpetuation of the cycle of violence against
women and children.
Although the CNMI was not expressly included in the
geographical definition of the “United States,” the answer to
the legal question of whether “immediate relatives” of
citizens and LPRs residing in the CNMI could file VAWA
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
94. See Interview with Jane Mack, Marianas Directing Attorney, Micronesian
Legal Servs. Corp., in Saipan, CNMI (June 8, 2009).
95. The “Immediate Relative of NonAlien Entry Permit” allows immediate
relatives of nonaliens to remain in the CNMI only and must be renewed yearly
at the discretion of the CNMI Director of Immigration. 5 N. MAR. I. ADMIN. CODE
§ 40.1638 (2004).
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selfpetitions was still not so clear, and the legal
representatives for the rejected applicant argued based on
the Covenant that immediate relatives were, in fact, eligible
to selfpetition despite the apparent lack of at least one of
the essential elements of eligibility: current or past
residence with the abuser “in the United States.”96 Under
Section 506(c) of the Covenant, the CNMI is considered part
of the United States for people seeking permanent residency
as immediate relatives:
With respect to aliens who are “immediate relatives” (as defined
in Subsection 201(b) of the [INA]) of United States citizens who
are permanently residing in the Northern Mariana Islands all the
provisions of the [INA] will apply, commencing when a claim is
made to entitlement to “immediate relative” status. A person who
is certified by the Government of the Northern Mariana Islands
both to have been a lawful permanent resident of the Northern
Mariana Islands and to have had the “immediate relative”
relationship denoted herein . . . will be presumed to have been
admitted to the United States for lawful permanent residence as
of that date without the requirement of any of the usual
97
procedures set forth in the [INA].

Thus, the CNMI can be considered the “United States” for
purposes of “immediate relative” petitions, including
petitions under VAWA.
A second argument for the eligibility of “immediate
relatives” in the CNMI to selfpetition is found in Section
502(a) of the Covenant, which states:
The following laws of the United States in existence on the
effective date of [the Covenant] and subsequent amendments to
such laws will apply to the Northern Mariana Islands, except as
96. See Instructions for Form I360, supra note 84, at 6; Form I360, supra
note 83, at 8. These two arguments were made on appeal by Micronesian Legal
Services Corporation (“MLSC”) on behalf of a client whose application was
rejected for lack of eligibility. See Interview with Jane Mack, Marianas
Directing Attorney, Micronesian Legal Servs. Corp., in Saipan, CNMI (Mar. 23,
2010). MLSC is a nonprofit legal aid organization that provides free legal
assistance in civil matters to low income residents in the CNMI, the Republic of
Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall
Islands.
About
Micronesian
Legal
Services
Corporation,
MLSC,
MICRONESIALAWHELP.ORG,
http://mlscnet.org/FM/StateAboutUs.cfm/County/
%20/City/%20/demoMode/%3D%201/Language/1/State/FM/TextOnly/N/ZipCode/
%20/LoggedIn/0 (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
97. Covenant, supra note 2, art. V § 506(c).
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otherwise provided in this Covenant: (1) [laws pertaining to
federal assistance and banking as they apply to Guam]; (2) those
laws . . . which are applicable to Guam and which are of general
98
application to the several states . . . .

VAWA, Division B of the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000 (“VTVPA”),99 amends the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,100
which applied to Guam at the time of the Covenant and
therefore to the CNMI through Section 502(a)(2) of the
Covenant when it came into effect. Thus, the 1968 Act and
its subsequent amendments (including VAWA) apply to the
CNMI. Further evidence of the eligibility for immediate
relatives to selfpetition under VAWA can be inferred from
the text of VAWA itself, which specifies the CNMI in the
allocation of grant money for shelter services.101
Despite these two arguments, which were brought up in
the appeal against the decision rejecting the selfpetition
from the CNMI, USCIS maintained that the language of the
INA was clear that the definition of the “United States”
excluded the CNMI, and that the requirement of past or
current residence “in the United States” therefore could not
be met. This problematic policy inconsistency was
ultimately resolved informally in favor of CNMI self
petitioners during the pendency of another review.102 Like
many other issues arising out of the unique federalCNMI
relationship, the situation was resolved through political
instead of legal reasoning. By this time, the CNRA had
already passed and it would only be a matter of months
before the INA would include the CNMI in the definition of
the “United States,” thereby dissolving any ambiguity with
regard to eligibility.

98. Id. § 502(a)(1)(2) (emphasis added).
99. Violence Against Women Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106386, 114 Stat. 1491
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 note (2006)).
100. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351,
82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2006)); see also Violence
Against Women Act § 1101 (amending Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act).
101. Violence Against Women Act §1202(b)(1).
102. See Interview with Jane Mack, supra note 96.
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III. CONCERNS OVER REFUGEES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
REFUGEE PROTECTION SYSTEM
While the unintended consequences concerning victim
rights and VAWA selfpetitions were recent problems that
were resolved rather quietly without media attention, the
situation regarding refugee protection has been an ongoing
international concern for over a decade, and constitutes one
of the official policy reasons buttressing the argument for
federal control of CNMI immigration under the CNRA. Two
articles of the Covenant are relevant to the debate over the
implementation of United States obligations regarding
refugees in the CNMI: (1) Article I, which concerns the
political relationship between the two entities and
establishes the “Covenant . . . together with those provisions
of the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States
applicable to the Northern Mariana Islands” as “the
supreme law” of the land;103 and (2) Article V, which
declared the inapplicability of most of the INA104 as well as
the “minimum wage provisions of [the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938].”105
The INA and the minimum wage exemptions combined
with the quotafree and dutyfree status of the CNMI were
specifically created to facilitate the economic development of
the islands.106 The exemption from United States
immigration laws allowed for the mass hiring of workers,
especially unskilled workers who would otherwise be unable
to qualify under the INA.107 These workers came from
neighboring countries in Asia and were hired to work in the
emerging garment, construction, and tourism industries,
which could not be fully staffed by the local population of
fewer than seventeen thousand people.108 Local control of
immigration also allowed for an easier process for tourists
from Asia and other countries to physically enter the CNMI
without visas or prescreening from United States consular
103. Covenant, supra note 2, art. I § 102.
104. Id. art. V § 503(a).
105. Id. § 503(c).
106. Rose Cruz Cuison, Comment, The Construction of Labor Abuse in the
Mariana Islands as AntiAmerican, 6 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 61, 71 (2000).
107. Id.
108. Id.
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officers.109 The minimum wage exemptions were created in
consideration of the CNMI’s young and developing economy
that “[could not] support the minimum wage laws which
[were] . . . based on the cost of living and the prevailing
wage levels in the highly developed American economy.”110
As a result of this arrangement, the economy
strengthened and correspondingly, the number of workers
and tourists from Asia increased dramatically.111 The
attractiveness of the CNMI as “U.S. soil” also increased for
those who might be seeking protection as refugees, but who
otherwise would not be able to enter Guam, which is only
fortyfive minutes from the CNMI by plane.112 The CNMI
was also potentially attractive to the United States
government when it came to diverting boatloads of illegal
immigrants from China seeking to enter Guam. According
to a local newspaper reporting on one in a series of
boatloads
carrying
undocumented
Chinese
illegal
immigrants to the island of Tinian in April of 1999:
Aside from overcrowding at the facilities in Guam, local officials
here say diverting these Chinese illegals would ease worries of the
US Immigration and Naturalization Service over the growing
incursions by illegal immigrants since these aliens would be
automatically excluded by the CNMI immigration office. The first
batch of Chinese illegals on Tinian were declared excluded since

109. See Northern Mariana Islands Covenant Implementation Act and
Northern Mariana Islands Delegate Act: Hearing on H.R. 3079 Before the
Subcomm. on Insular Affairs of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 110th
Cong. (2007) (statement of David B. Cohen, Deputy Assistant Sec’y, U.S.
Interior for Insular Affairs), reprinted in Cohen’s Statement Before the House
Subcommittee, SAIPAN TRIB., Aug. 20, 2007, http://saipantribune.com/
newsstory.aspx?cat=3&newsID=71520
[hereinafter
Cohen’s
Statement]
(discussing concerns over the apparent ease with which tourists may enter the
Commonwealth without a prescreening process similar to that utilized by the
federal government).
110. MARIANAS POLITICAL STATUS COMM’N, supra note 12, at 5758.
111. See id. at 7273.
112. See, e.g., Liberty Dones, 7 Tourists Apply for Refugee Protection, SAIPAN
TRIB., May 8, 2006, http://saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=
57300&cat=1. These overstaying tourists applied in 2006, when there was
already a refugee protection system in place. It is not clear how many people, if
any, entered the CNMI as tourists and later sought protection prior to 2005,
when the local refugee protection regulations were finally adopted.
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It was becoming increasingly clear that, whether
through diversion, tourism, or immigration, more and more
people were entering the CNMI who could potentially
qualify as refugees, but there was yet no standardized
process of addressing claims systematically.114 Although
there was an Immigration and Naturalization Service
(“INS”) representative on the main island of Saipan,
asylum/refugee applications were rejected and applicants
were informed that no INS office would process their
applications.115 Reasons for the inability to process
applications ranged from the nearplenary power of the
CNMI over its immigration to the inability of the CNMI to
grant anything like “political asylum” because such an act
would be a foreign affairs function that belonged exclusively
to the federal government.116 This growing problem did not
go unnoticed in Washington, D.C. The year before, in 1998,
the Congressional Commission on Immigration Reform
recommended that a system for asylum be established, but
the proposal was ultimately “swept under the rug.”117
While the issue of the applicability of federal
refugee/asylum laws was receding into a topic of “silent
debate[ ]” in Congress,118 it was resurfacing in the courts. In
2001 the Federal District Court for the Northern Mariana
113. Cookie B. Micaller, Another Chinese Boat Diverted to Tinian, SAIPAN
TRIB., Apr. 26, 1999, http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=
1&newsID=1806. The attempts to enter Guam via boat from the CNMI
continued to be problematic. See, e.g., Ferdie de la Torre, 5 More Defendants in
Human Smuggling Case Plead Guilty, SAIPAN TRIB., Jan. 26, 2010,
http://saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=96759.
114. According to another news article, eightynine of approximately 537 boat
people held on Tinian in 1999 were sent to the United States “for potential
asylum processing under the United Nations guidelines.” INS Rejects Asylum
Applications. Lawyer Jorgenson Says He May Take Court Action, SAIPAN TRIB.,
Aug. 14, 1999, http://saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=3255&cat=1
[hereinafter INS Rejects Asylum Applications].
115. Asylum Seekers Sue US, CNMI Governments, SAIPAN TRIB., Sept. 3, 1999,
http://saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=3534.
116. INS Rejects Asylum Applications, supra note 114.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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Islands finally addressed the issue of applicability in Ahmed
v. Goldberg.119 In Ahmed, the plaintiffs argued that the
failure of the CNMI to provide asylum/refugee regulations
violated the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees
(“Protocol”) and customary international law.120 With regard
to the claims based directly on the Protocol, the court held
that as a nonselfexecuting treaty, the provisions of the
Protocol are not directly enforceable by a private party in
court, and therefore the plaintiffs could not state a claim for
relief based on those provisions.121
The court next addressed the plaintiffs’ claims based on
the implementing legislation for the Protocol—the INA as
amended by the 1980 Refugee Act. The court found that
“the Covenant which governs the applicability of federal law
to the CNMI, renders most INA provisions inapplicable to
the CNMI, including the provisions for asylum and
withholding of [removal].”122 The court reasoned that “[t]he
purpose of restricting the INA is to allow the CNMI to
control its own immigration” and that “[t]his authority
includes the granting of political asylum and refugee status
within the CNMI because of the close nexus with
immigration.”123 Thus, the CNMI was not constrained by the
INA and the “violation of inapplicable INA provisions would
not subject the CNMI to liability.”124
The plaintiffs’ third Protocolbased argument was that
the Protocol was the supreme law of the land under the
Covenant and a “part of CNMI law through the CNMI’s
adoption of the Restatements of Law.”125 They cited Section
119. Ahmed v. Goldberg, No. Civ.A. 000005, 2001 WL 1842399 (D. N. Mar. I.
May 11, 2001). This was a consolidated case with Liang v. Goldberg, No. Civ.A.
990046, 2001 WL 1842399 (D. N. Mar. I. May 11, 2001).
120. Ahmed, 2001 WL 1842399, at *3, *5.
121. Id. at *4.
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Tran v. CNMI, 780 F. Supp. 709, 713 (D. N. Mar. I. 1991)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
In all proceedings, the rules of the common law, as expressed in the
restatements of the law approved by the American Law Institute and,
to the extent not so expressed as generally understood and applied in
the United States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the
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111(1) of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, which states that international
agreements of the United States are the “law of the United
States and supreme over the law of the several states” and
that “[i]nterpretations of international agreements by the
United States Supreme Court are binding on the States.”126
The plaintiffs then argued that the CNMI’s lack of an
asylum procedure and its discretionary nonrefoulement
provision127 were incongruous with Supreme Court
interpretations of the Protocol.128 In response, the district
court turned to the supremacy clause of the Covenant,
which refers to the “treaties and laws of the United States
applicable to the Northern Mariana Islands” as being the
“supreme law” of the land.129 The court found that based on
this clause “only applicable international agreements of the
United States are considered to be the supreme law of the
CNMI, and the Protocol [did] not appear to fall within that
purview.”130 The court ultimately held that because the
Protocol’s implementing legislation excluded the CNMI, it
could not be considered applicable federal law under the
Covenant; therefore, the plaintiffs could not state a claim
for relief “based on the repugnancy of CNMI law to the
Protocol.”131
Finally, the plaintiffs argued that the provisions of the
1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol are a part of
Commonwealth, in the absence of written law or local customary law to
the contrary.
Id. at *4 n.14 (quoting 7 N. MAR. I. CODE § 3401 (2004)).
126. Id. at *4.
127. “The Attorney General may decline to designate as destination any
country where in his opinion the excluded or deported person would be subject
to persecution on account of race, religion or political persuasion.” 3 N. MAR. I.
CODE § 4344(d) (2004) (emphasis added). The principle of nonrefoulement
“guarantees that individuals have the right not to be forcibly returned to
countries where they face persecution.” David Weissbrodt & Isabel Hörtreiter,
The Principle of NonRefoulement: Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in
Comparison with the NonRefoulement Provisions of Other Human Rights
Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999).
128. Ahmed, 2001 WL 1842399, at *4.
129. See Covenant, supra note 2, art. I §102.
130. Ahmed, 2001 WL 1842399, at *4.
131. Id. at *5.
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customary international law and involve jus cogens132 norms
that are binding on the CNMI.133 The court found that
customary international law was applicable and that the
Covenant and the INA “show no clear intent . . . to preclude”
its application, nor would its application be in conflict with
the plain language of the INA or the Covenant.134 Following
the Charming Betsy principle that “to the extent possible,
courts must construe federal law so as to avoid violating
principles of public international law,”135 the court refused to
“presume that Congress intended to preempt [the]
application [of customary international law relating to
asylum], thereby permitting the CNMI to exercise its
immigration authority without regard to international
standards.”136 However, the court found that the plaintiffs
“failed to clearly identify a ‘specific, universal and
obligatory’ principle of customary international law relating
to their asylum claims” and thus they “failed to sufficiently
state a claim for relief.”137 The court ultimately dismissed
the relevant claims but granted leave to amend.
In the aftermath of Ahmed, more pressure was placed
on the CNMI government to adopt a system that would
comply with the Refugee Convention and Protocol as well as
the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), even if it did not
exactly mirror the federal system. In September of 2003, the
governor of the CNMI and the Department of the Interior’s
Office of Insular Affairs (which administers the relationship
between the United States and its territories) signed a
memorandum of agreement to address federal concerns over
refugee protection.138 The local legislature also passed Public
Law 1361 to amend the Commonwealth Entry and
Deportation Act and to require the Attorney General to
132. “Jus cogens is a legal concept in international law which argues that
there are rights so fundamental to society that any law which abridges them is
automatically voided.” Fallon, supra note 37, at 29 n.15.
133. Ahmed, 2001 WL 1842399, at *5.
134. Id. at *6.
135. Id. (citing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64
(1804)).
136. Id. (citing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64
(1804)).
137. Id. at *8.
138. See Cohen’s Statement, supra note 109.
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promulgate regulations to implement the requirements of
the Protocol and CAT.139 The legislature emphasized,
however, that it retained “exclusive jurisdiction over
matters related to immigration” and stressed that
“provisions set forth in the United States Code relat[ing] to
immigration, asylum, or refugee status do not apply within
the Commonwealth and may not be relied upon by any
individual within the Commonwealth seeking relief
pursuant to any such provision of the United States
Code.”140
Public Law 1361 notably removed the Attorney
General’s discretion with regard to removal (i.e.,
deportation) if it was “more likely than not that the person’s
life or freedom would be threatened in that country on
account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, or that the
person would be tortured if removed to the proposed country
of origin . . . .”141 Under the statute, the decision of the
Attorney General would be “final and unreviewable
administratively or judicially.”142 Although Public Law 1361
was signed into law in January of 2004, the proposed
regulations implementing the law were not adopted until
September of 2004, with the final amendments being
adopted in 2005, due to USCIS and United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) dissatisfaction with
the initial and amended regulations.143
The major difference between the refugee protection
system that was eventually established and the United
139. 2003 N. Mar. I. Pub. L. 1361, §§ 12.
140. Id. § 1.
141. Id. § 2(d). The original provision stated: “The Attorney General may
decline to designate as destination any country where in his opinion the
excluded or deported person would be subject to persecution on account of race,
religion or political persuasion.” Id.
142. Id.
143. See Agnes E. Donato, CIS, UN Unsatisfied with NMI Asylum Regs,
SAIPAN TRIB., Aug. 27, 2004, http://saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=
1&newsID=39880. Changes to the original policy as a result of USCIS and
UNHCR recommendations included allowing for qualified interpreters,
extending the filing deadline from three to ten days, and instituting a review
procedure for claims that are determined to be clearly unfounded. See Agnes E.
Donato, Refugee Protection Policy Adopted–Finally, SAIPAN TRIB., Sept. 30, 2004,
http://saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=40746.
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States asylum/refugee system under the INA is that the
CNMI provided for nonrefoulement only, with protection
similar to withholding of removal (and deferral of removal
under CAT), but no equivalent to asylum, which was seen
as discretionary under Article 33 of the Refugee
Convention.144 This distinction is significant in several
regards, particularly in the burden of proof placed on
applicants and the benefits afforded to recipients of either
form of relief from removal. For asylum, an applicant need
only establish a “wellfounded fear” of persecution, which
could be only a ten percent chance that the applicant would
be persecuted upon return to his or her country of origin.145
By contrast, applicants for withholding of removal must
establish that they are “more likely than not” to be
persecuted, which is a greater than fifty percent chance that
they would be persecuted upon return.146 Thus, the burden
of proof is higher for applicants seeking withholding of
removal versus asylum.
With regard to benefits, an asylee (a person granted
asylum) may obtain asylum for his or her dependent spouse
and minor children living in the United States, or may later
bring into the United States a spouse and minor children as
derivative beneficiaries, if those dependants are living
abroad.147 An asylee can also apply to be a lawful permanent
resident (i.e., get a “green card”) after a year, which
generally would mean that the asylee could become a
United States citizen after five years.148 No such benefits are
available for those granted withholding of removal or
deferral of removal under CAT.149 Thus, not only is the
burden of proof higher for applicants seeking withholding of
removal and deferral of removal under CAT, the benefits

144. See Marian A. Maraya, Lawmakers Reviewing UN Asylum Treaty, SAIPAN
TRIB., Jan. 2, 2003, http://saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&news
ID=25161.
145. Jaya RamjiNogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 308 n.26 (2007) (citing INS v. Cardoza
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987)).
146. Id. (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 42324 (1984)).
147. Id. at 309.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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are also fewer.150 Under the CNMI system, the benefits
provided for those who are granted protection from
refoulement are limited and similar to the benefits provided
under a grant of withholding of removal. Those granted
protection would only be able to live in and travel within the
CNMI, but nowhere else on United States soil.151 This
arrangement was seen as permissible in light of the CNMI’s
control over its own immigration, but its inability to grant
citizenship or rights to enter the United States.
A. Applying for Refugee Protection
The CNMI regulations concerning nonrefoulement are
found in Title 5, Part 900 of the Northern Mariana Islands
Administrative Code (“NMIAC”), which established the
Office of Refugee Protection (“ORP”) within the Office of the
Attorney General.152 Under the regulations, foreign
nationals who have been excluded at a port of entry or who
have been ordered deported by the Commonwealth Superior
Court (the trial court) must receive certain advisements,
such as the ability to obtain a protection hearing if there is
a genuine (i.e., “not manifestly unfounded”) fear of
persecution or torture if returned to the country of removal;
the right to obtain representation at the applicant’s
expense; and the right to be provided with contact
information for the CNMI Bar Association and other
organizations that assist foreign nationals.153 Because there
150. The rationale for the distinctions in burden and benefits between asylum
and withholding of removal rests on the discretionary nature of asylum versus
the mandatory nature of withholding of removal. Whereas asylum with all its
benefits is seen as a discretionary grant of relief, withholding of removal is
mandatory, with few exceptions, if a person can prove that he or she will “more
likely than not” suffer persecution on account of one of five enumerated grounds
such as race, religion, and political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006); see
Andrew Schoenholtz, Beyond the Supreme Court: A Modest Plea to Improve Our
Asylum System, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 541, 541 (2000). For this reason, the
preferred form of relief for those who fear persecution if they return to their
country of origin would be asylum, and then withholding/deferral of removal if
for some reason they are ineligible for asylum (e.g., if they are convicted of
certain crimes, or for noncriminal reasons, such as failure to file an application
within one year of entry into the United States).
151. See Maraya, supra note 144.
152. 5 N. MAR. I. ADMIN. CODE § 540.1906 (2004).
153. Id. §§ 540.1914(a)(1)(i)(iii).
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are no affirmative applications154 for protection under
Section 540.1904, applicants already present in the CNMI
must stipulate to deportation if not already subject to an
order of deportation from the court.
Both deportable applicants and applicants excluded at a
port of entry would then undergo a hearing informally
known as a “manifestly unfounded” hearing, which is
usually conducted by an appointee of the CNMI Attorney
General called an administrative protection judge (“APJ”).155
Hearings are recorded electronically, interpreters are
provided, if requested, and decisions by the APJ must be in
writing.156 Manifestly unfounded claims are those that are
“clearly fraudulent” or else “not related to the criteria for
the granting of nonrefoulement protection.”157 If an
application is deemed “manifestly unfounded,” the applicant
may file a written request for review, but the decision
regarding the request is final and not subject to further
review either through administrative or judicial
proceedings.158 The applicant has the right to remain in the
Commonwealth pending a decision, although he or she may
be compelled to remain in detention.159
If a claim is deemed not manifestly unfounded, the
foreign national is given the application for nonrefoulement
protection with only ten business days to file it.160 On the
day the application is filed, the ORP schedules a protection
154.
An affirmative applicant seeks asylum on her own initiative, and
voluntarily identifies herself to the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) through her application. An affirmative applicant may be either
an individual who maintains a valid nonimmigrant visa . . . or a person
who either overstayed her visa or entered the United States without
being formally processed by an immigration official.
RamjiNogales et al., supra note 145, at 305. In contrast, “[a] defensive
applicant applies for asylum after having been apprehended by DHS and placed
in removal proceedings.” Id.
155. 5 N. MAR. I. ADMIN. CODE § 540.1912 (2004). The APJ is usually an
Assistant Attorney General.
156. Id.
157. Id. § 540.1912(b) (2004) (emphasis added).
158. Id. § 540.1912(c).
159. Id.
160. Id. § 540.1916(a)(1).
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hearing date, and the applicant’s failure to appear at the
hearing is considered an abandonment of the application.161
Both excludable and deportable applicants may be detained
or paroled into the CNMI at the discretion of the Attorney
General pending a decision on their applications for
protection.162 Excluded persons, however, must remain in
detention until they clear a fingerprinting and background
check.163
Section 540.1930 outlines the substantive law to be
applied in adjudicating claims, and states that United
States law and the law of other jurisdictions applying the
treaty provisions are persuasive, but not binding
authority.164 Similar to establishing eligibility for
withholding of removal under the INA, the burden of proof
is on the applicant to prove that his or her life would be
threatened on account of the five protected grounds under
the INA and the Convention.165 “The testimony of the
applicant, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the
burden of proof without corroboration.”166 If an applicant can
establish past persecution, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the applicant’s life or freedom would be
threatened.167 The burden then shifts to the government to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there is
either a fundamental change in circumstances in the
country of removal or else the applicant can avoid future
threat through internal relocation.168
If an applicant cannot establish past persecution, the
applicant can still demonstrate that his or her life or
freedom would be threatened under a “more likely than not”
standard and on account of a protected ground.169 Unlike the
United States system, if the applicant cannot establish past
persecution, the burden is on the applicant to prove that
161. Id. §§ 540.1916(d)(e).
162. Id. § 540.1918.
163. Id. § 540.1920.
164. See id. § 540.1930.
165. Id. § 540.1930(a).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 540.1930(a)(1)(i).
168. Id. §§ 540.1930(a)(1)(i)(A)(B).
169. Id. § 540.1930(a)(2).

840

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol.59

internal relocation is not reasonable, unless the persecutor
is the government or the persecution is government
sponsored.170 Evidence to prove persecution that is “more
likely than not” includes singling out or targeting, but
also—in the absence of targeting—a pattern or practice of
persecuting persons similarly situated.171
B. Applying Under CAT
Protections under CAT are similar to protections
afforded by the United States system. Torture is defined as:
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or her or a third person, or for any
reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
172
official capacity.

The definition of torture excludes “lesser forms of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” and “pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incident to
lawful sanctions.”173 In order to constitute torture, an act
must be specifically intended to inflict the suffering; the act
must be directed against a person in the offender’s custody
or control; and “[a]cquiescence of a public official requires
that the public official, prior to the activity constituting
torture, have awareness of such activity and thereafter
breach his or her legal responsibility to intervene to prevent
such activity.”174
C. Mandatory Denial
Applicants for both refugee nonrefoulement and CAT
protection are subject to mandatory denials under Section 5
170. Id. §§ 540.1930(a)(3)(i)(ii).
171. Id. §§ 540.1930(a)(2)(i)(ii).
172. Id. § 540.1930(b)(1)(i).
173. Id. §§ 540.1930(b)(1)(ii)(iii).
174. Id. §§ 540.1930(b)(1)(v)(vii).
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40.1932, although applicants otherwise eligible for CAT
protection will be granted a deferral of removal.175
Applications for refugee or CAT protection are subject to
mandatory denial if the applicant “ordered, incited, assisted
or participated in the persecution of others” on account of
one of the protected grounds;176 if the applicant was
“convicted of a particularly serious crime and the APJ
determines that the applicant constitutes a danger to the
community;”177 if “[t]here are serious reasons for believing
that the applicant has committed a serious nonpolitical
crime outside the Commonwealth, prior to arrival”;178 and if
“[t]here are reasonable grounds to believe that the
individual is a danger to the safety or security of the
Commonwealth.”179
D. Benefits of Protection
Any “grant of protection is for an indefinite period” and,
unlike asylum under the INA, a grant of protection “does
not bestow upon an applicant a right [or route] to remain
permanently in the Commonwealth.”180 Applicants also do
not have a right to work in the Commonwealth at the time
they request protection, but they may request temporary
work authorization “before a final decision, meaning all
appeals have been exhausted, is made on their case if ninety
calendar days have passed since the initial request for
protection . . . or if they have been granted a conditional
grant of protection.”181 Protection grantees have no
permanent work authorization, and temporary work
authorization must be renewed annually upon a finding of
continued refugee status by the CNMI Attorney General.182
Grantees and derivative beneficiaries have a right to
travel, but must obtain advance permission from the ORP.183
175. Id. § 540.1930(b)(4).
176. Id. § 540.1932(b)(1)(i)(A).
177. Id. § 540.1932(b)(1)(i)(B).
178. Id. § 540.1932(b)(1)(i)(C).
179. Id. § 540.1932(b)(1)(i)(D).
180. Id. § 540.1938.
181. Id. § 540.1940.
182. Id. § 540.1948.
183. Id. § 540.1942.
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Derivative protection for immediate family members is
another significant difference between the CNMI and the
United States system because only those immediate family
members who are present in the Commonwealth at the time
of the application for protection can receive derivative
protection.184 Grantees and derivative beneficiaries have a
right to assistance and are eligible for public benefits.185
E. Appeals
The government or the applicant may appeal within
fifteen business days a decision to grant, deny, or terminate
protection.186 The Attorney General has discretion to
“[r]estrict review to the existing record; [p]ermit or request
legal briefs or supplement the record with new evidence;
[h]ear oral argument; or [h]ear the matter de novo.”187 The
decision of the Attorney General is final and not subject to
further administrative or judicial review.188
IV. CONTINUING CONCERNS AND THE FUTURE OF REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN THE CNMI
It is evident from the regulations implementing refugee
and CAT protection that the CNMI system does not offer a
stable situation for those fleeing persecution, and it
arguably includes certain disincentives, such as the
requirement that derivative beneficiaries be physically
present in the Commonwealth at the time of application. It
also maintains a system in which geography remains
significant and even decisive—those eligible to remain “in
the United States” because they qualify under the lower
standard for asylum are not eligible to remain in the CNMI
and will be returned because they cannot meet the higher
“more likely than not” standard.
184. Id. § 540.1944. This issue has received some notice in the press. See
Ferdie de la Torre, Family of Person Granted Refoulement Protection Not
Covered By Protection, SAIPAN TRIB., Mar. 2, 2007, http://saipantribune.com/
newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=66186.
185. 5 N. MAR. I. ADMIN. CODE § 540.1952.
186. Id. § 540.1936.
187. Id. §§ 540.1936(d)(1)(4).
188. Id. § 540.1936(f).
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Although the regulations addressed the basic issues
regarding compliance with the Refugee Convention, the
Protocol, and CAT, concerns persisted over the
administration of the system, but were included within the
larger framework of federal dissatisfaction with CNMI
immigration policies generally. This time, however, federal
dissatisfaction was reinforced by the resurgence of military
interest in Micronesia, and especially in the Marianas. The
United States had begun a major military buildup on the
212square mile island of Guam and began planning the
transfer of 8000 marines and their dependents from
Okinawa for a military presence of 20,500 troops and
personnel and an additional 9000 dependents over a period
of ten years.189 According to a report by the United States
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), this buildup is
part of “a major realignment” planned by the Department of
Defense to move other Navy, Air Force, and Army units to
Guam.190 Federal concern over CNMI immigration then
became linked with national security,191 and human rights
issues such as refugee protection and concern over human
trafficking became more prominent in debates. The need for
federal control of immigration was subsequently framed in
terms of human rights and protecting refugees.192 According
189. U.S.
GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE,
GAO08722T,
DEFENSE
INFRASTRUCTURE: PLANNING EFFORTS FOR THE PROPOSED MILITARY BUILDUP ON
GUAM ARE IN THEIR INITIAL STAGES, WITH MANY CHALLENGES YET TO BE
ADDRESSED 11 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08722t.pdf.
190. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO08791, COMMONWEALTH OF THE
NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS: MANAGING POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF
APPLYING U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW REQUIRES COORDINATED FEDERAL DECISIONS
ADDITIONAL DATA 13 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/
AND
new.items/d08791.pdf.
191. See S. REP. No. 110324 at 34 (2008).
In a post9/11 environment, and given the CNMI’s location and the
number of aliens that travel there, we believe that continued local
control of the CNMI’s immigration system presents significant national
security and homeland security concerns.
....
. . . With the planned military buildup on Guam, the potential for
smuggling aliens from the CNMI into Guam by boat is a cause for
concern.
Cohen’s Statement, supra note 109.
192. “The CNMI’s alleged failure to effectively implement the Refugee
Protection Program has become a linchpin in convincing U.S. lawmakers to
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to a report by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Interior
for Insular Affairs before the House Subcommittee on
Insular Affairs:
[I]f the Federal Government cannot verify that the CNMI is
administering its refugee protection program in a manner that
accords with U.S. compliance with international treaty
obligations, then extending the protections available under U.S.
immigration law to cover aliens in the CNMI may be the only way
to ensure that compliance. However, making aliens in the CNMI
eligible to apply for protection in the U.S. is a potentially serious
problem if the CNMI maintains control over its immigration
system . . . [because] the U.S. could be required to provide refugee
protection to aliens who have been admitted to the CNMI through
a process controlled not by the Federal Government . . . . This is a
strong argument in favor of Congress taking legislative action . . .
193
.

In 2008 Congress passed the CNRA, which included the
gradual phasing in of federal control over immigration in
the CNMI and extended the INA to the CNMI such that
presence in the CNMI under the INA is considered presence
“in the United States.” The transition period began on
November 28, 2009, and is scheduled to end, with few
exceptions, on December 31, 2014.194 Regarding asylum, the
CNRA makes asylum applications under Section 208 of the
INA inapplicable until the end of the transition period.195
This provision adopts the recommendation of Senate Report
324, which suggested making Section 208 inapplicable
during the transition period “given the uncertainties
inherent in changing the CNMI immigration regimen.”196
From a strategic perspective, the inapplicability of Section
208 with its lower standard of proof would reduce the
number of people who can receive protection and the
approve the CNMI federalized immigration bills.” Cohen Yet to Get AGO
Response to Refugee Protection Concerns, SAIPAN TRIB., Aug. 14, 2007,
http://saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=71329.
193. Cohen’s Statement, supra note 109.
194. Consolidated Natural Resources Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110229, §
702(a), 122 Stat. 754, 85455 (codified as amended at 48 U.S.C. 1806 (2006)).
195. Id.
196. S. REP. No. 110324, at 18 (2008) (generally approving bill S. 1634, but
recommending that the bill be changed to prevent the application of the asylum
provisions of the INA until after the transition period in 2014).
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additional benefits of asylum because they would have to
apply under withholding of removal standards and likewise
receive those benefits. Because the number of foreign
nationals will be reduced significantly through the phasing
out process during the transition period, the number of
people who will be able to even apply for asylum in 2014
will likewise be significantly reduced.
CONCLUSION
The problems surrounding the protection of immigrants
and refugees on United States soil but not “in the United
States” for INA purposes are just two of the many
unintended consequences resulting from the political
wrangling that occurred after World War II in Micronesia
and later in the Marianas, where emerging human rights,
decolonization, and selfdetermination norms competed with
United States military and local economic interests to
produce the Covenant. Addressing the legal issues arising
out of the unique federalCNMI relationship involved, and
will likely continue to involve, political “solutions” devised
by the political branches more than legal reasoning crafted
by the judiciary. Although the CNRA attempts to address
some of these unintended consequences—at least with
regard to immigration—its effect, especially on refugees, is
still unknown, especially for those who could qualify under
asylum standards if they were “in the United States,” but
who will be rejected because the INA asylum provisions will
not apply until 2014.

